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 My intention is to offer a brief description of the historical background of 
the globalization phenomenon and some of its key traits. I shall use those traits 
to describe the main changes that have determined globalization in political 
government institutions and to indicate some of the questions they suggest when 
philosophising on society and law.
1. A METALEGAL INTRODUCTION
1.1. From Post-World War Two to the Third Industrial revolution
 In the area of legal thinking, we are actually very far from the environment 
that followed World War Two. Suffice it to mention G. Capograssi’s unforgettable 
article, “Il diritto dopo la catastrofe”, to evoke the ethical dimension of legal phi-
losophy after the war. However, a keen awareness of what had happened —the war 
itself, saturation bombing, the extermination camps, Hiroshima, Nagasaki— and 
the desire for it never to happen again provided the basis for a degree of optimism 
in the law field. The main point of reference for that optimism is Kelsen, the great 
20th century legal philosopher.
 Kelsen helped not only to clarify legal concepts on the whole, as well as the 
juridification of certain power relationships that were still apart from law. He was 
also a notable promoter of International Law, the search for peace through law, 
proscription of war, and the institutionalization of the international society of 
states. The labour of that great jurist during the darkest years of the 20th century 
crystallised in the international community’s new institutions and regulations after 
the War.
 The UN was created, giving great institutional weight to the victors of the 
World War. The legal optimism following the defeat of fascism found expression 
in the United Nation’s Declaration of Human Rights. The Declaration established 
the limits of what the Earth’s Nomos find admissible, by humanity’s common 
law.
 That post-war optimism, which, we must add, was blind to the war crimes of 
the victors, was brief. It ended abruptly in the sectarian atmosphere of the cold 
war and its nuclear threat. Nonetheless, perhaps due to the political bipolarity of 
those days, subsequent years saw the culmination of large-scale decolonisation. 
Today, however, many former colonial countries remain economically dependent, 
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in the heteronomy and lack of resources, that is, in the conditions incubated by 
the far-off legacy of the colonial era. 
 On the other hand, during the second half of the 20th century, industrial 
policy, although often controlled by bureaucracies and authoritarian regimes —not 
only in eastern Europe and in China, but also in Spain, Algeria, Iran and many 
other countries, albeit less intensely— launched many populations along the path 
to quantitative economic growth. In other less materially unfortunate societies, 
Keynesian policies presided over an identical kind of growth, but they facilitated 
the acknowledgement of worker’s social rights immediately after the War. 
 Economic growth during the first twenty-five years after post-war reconstruction 
gradually established interdependency between the world’s societies. At the begin-
ning of the 1970s, a global problem that expressed that objective interdependency 
became clearly obvious: that economic growth generates the degradation of the 
environment; that the industrial civilization based on quantitative growth contrasts 
with finite conditions of the environment that have made human life possible, by 
degrading and destroying it. The rise of a serious environmental problem is the 
first important manifestation of what we have come to know as globalization.
1.2. The Great Transformation
 Twenty-five years of post-war economic growth set the basis or the conditions 
for the big and decisive changes that have configured the present. These great 
changes have been, simultaneously, the third industrial revolution and a conserva-
tive social counter-revolution. 
 At the same time, at the political level, the big bureaucratic systems of social 
dominance in Europe have collapsed or suffered their crisis in other fields.
 As everyone knows, the third industrial revolution is characterised by the 
introduction of computers in productive activity; by the use of new materials of 
chemical origin; and, above all, by new ways of organising production institu-
tions, which have been completely transformed. From the latter point of view, 
the large increase of multinational companies, which in many cases f it into each 
other like Russian dolls, and their networking are the most notable novelties of 
this stage.
 The conservative counter-revolution has consisted in the introduction of neo-
liberal economic and social policies. Huge masses of formerly public goods and 
services have been privatized in the countries where they existed. Capital has been 
freed of many of its social, fiscal and political charges (even, for instance, the 
obligation to invest in concessionary companies providing public services) in the 
so-called deregulation movement of the last few years. Workers have lost many 
of their social conquests of earlier years.
 The collapse of the systems of bureaucratic domination cannot hide the severe 
crisis that representative governments are experiencing, which is apparent in the 
lack of political prestige in many “mature” societies. 
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 Taking into consideration globalization’s international division of labour, we 
can distinguish four types of societies on the basis of the tasks assigned to them 
by that division:
 (a) “Mature” or “key” countries that tend to expel or “outsource” second 
industrial revolution industries and keeping those that produce more added value. 
These societies retain certain social benefits but also immense bureaucracies. 
Complexes of military-industrial interest are located in those countries.
 (b) An “economic periphery” (China, India, Brazil and some Asian countries) 
around the centre, whose industries have scant perspectives of improving their 
productivity and whose localization is determined by low salaries combined with 
adequate training and perhaps strong social control, as well as weak fiscal —and, 
in general, state pressure— on capital. 
 (c) The “forsaken” world on the “outer edge”: such as certain parts of Africa 
and Latin America, where there has been no investment.
 (d) Countries that are in between the above categories, such as many big 
Arab countries: with strong social cohesion, historic and cultural density, but in 
which there are no conditions to attract capital investment and whose situation is 
unsustainable in the mid-term within the commercial logic of globalization.
1.3. Great tensions in a globalized society
The principal tensions word-wide have to do with the international division of 
labour, environmental issues (particularly where power is concerned), with the 
organisation of labour and the new institutionalization of political power.
1.3.1. International division of labour: 
 Some societies forsaken by globalization’s division of labour suffer internal 
conflicts derived from poverty. They may assume these conflicts culturally; for 
example, inter-ethnically (i.e. in them, certain discriminatory differences gain 
considerable cultural relevance). They can also lead to an inability to maintain 
an order of any kind in these conditions of aggravated abject poverty. Tensions 
of these kinds can only be marginally exported to other societies and therefore 
they are not very relevant on the political level, although they still deeply offend 
humanity’s moral conscience. Earth’s Nomos only knows how to mediate in these 
conflicts post festum, by genocide trials. Most non-governmental humanitarian 
organisations’ work is carried out in these kinds of societies.
 It cannot be said that the so-called right to humanitarian interference is a 
development of International Law: in any case, it is its arguable and shaming state 
of necessity, on which there can be little theorising. Interferences decided without 
the forsaken societies, which in fact turn out to be societies with no voice before 
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international society. “Humanitarian” interference can even be something else: 
soi disant “humanitarian” military intervention, such as that which Serbia had to 
support regarding Kosovo, legitimated with false data before international public 
opinion1.
 The countries here called intermediate countries, which have socio-historic 
density but without clear perspectives in the international division of labour, as 
opposed to the forsaken countries, can export their problems (large quantities of 
population, scant job opportunities and therefore difficulty in surviving) principally 
towards the system’s centre, either in the way of migrations or in that terrible form 
of political impotence: terrorism. 
 In the 17th century, Hobbes pointed out that in “humanity’s natural condition” 
—a theoretical model that is somewhat similar to the globalized international 
order— not even the strong are safe, for they too must sleep. He saw in this a 
reasonable foundation for accepting a sovereign who is above any other community 
member, whether weak or strong. If Hobbes’ argument holds, globalization should 
opt for one of the following: either search for an international order that everyone 
can accept or the strong will have to implement a permanent and one-sided state 
of watchfulness.
 The “state of watchfulness” currently implies a substantial reduction of people’s 
rights and guarantees in general. In reality, it means specific developments such 
as “the enemy’s criminal law”, the triumph and resurrection of Carl Schmitt and 
his logic, by virtue of which people’s rights exist or disappear according to the 
distinction between “friend” and “enemy” made by the sovereign of the moment. 
This is the first lesson to learn from Guantanamo’s law faculty.
1.3.2. The environmental issue
 The contradiction between Earth’s finite resources and the demands of produc-
tion in necessarily quantitative growth has been known for decades. The problems 
generated by an increasingly accelerated population growth —with its subsequent 
increase of needs, resources and waste— are also well known.
 The huge productive potential of certain contemporary technologies that are 
used to face growing needs make the problems generated by those very technolo-
gies increasingly unmanageable. Such technologies are ontologically dangerous, 
since their use has the same potential for destruction as it has for production. 
Obviously, we are thinking of nuclear, chemical and biotechnological industries. 
 1. The 500,000 Kosovars who are supposed to have disappeared in April 1999, according to
United State’s Department of State, were supposed to be 10,000 at the end of the war, according to 
Britain’s Foreign Office, to end in the 2,018 actual corpses found by The Hague’s International Court 
of Justice (Le Monde Diplomatique, Spanish edition, March 2000, page 12). 
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 The effects of environmental damage are not only serious. Above all, in 
many cases they are decisive and distant, both in space and in time. In signifi-
cant instances, they make attributing legal liability equally unmanageable, since 
the individuals involved either can not be determined or, which is practically the 
same, are not in a position to assume their responsibility. 
 The value of the environmental damage caused can be higher than the com-
mercial value of the agent that caused it. This elementary truth makes Law’s 
legal-commercial remedies unviable in many cases in which, in fact, the damage 
is objectively socialized, with or without the intervention of Law. 
 Despite this, an attempt is made to use mechanisms based on market economy, 
such as the ones established by the Kyoto Protocol, at least to contain the pace 
of environmental disaster. However, precarious solutions of this type, emergency 
solutions, actually show that existing economic and government systems are not 
in a position to provide lasting solutions to the degradation of the human envi-
ronment, precisely when political philosophy has discovered that we have some 
responsibilities towards future generations.
 The environmental crisis demands a redefinition of the scale of admissible 
decisions in terms of democratic doctrine. Democratic decisions are characterised 
by their reversibility: in principle, they must be taken by the social groups that are 
affected by them, and those same groups must be able to annul them. However, 
certain decisions made by current generations can affect future generations with 
irreversible effects. Therefore, from a democratic point of view, environmental 
issues oblige us to redefine the action in terms of scale: in any case, we ought to 
leave future generations a world that can be managed.
 Therefore —and without entering the important issue of the organisation of 
labour in neo-liberal globalisation, which raises social dumping to the status of 
model behaviour in human resources—, we need to draw attention to the political 
aspects of globalization, to its new institutions. Today, they are the institutions that 
articulate the actions of human beings so they can face the social issues posed by 
globalization itself.
2. THE MUTATION OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
 At the level of public bodies, the broadest consequence of the combination 
of the new industrial revolution and the conservative counter-revolution that has 
led to globalization is a profound mutation in the order of political institutions.
2.1. The urge to take part in politics
 From the mid-19th century to the last quarter of the 20th century, more and 
more people were attracted to politics in the key countries. The working classes 
started to take part in politics, creating and sustaining intermediate bodies to 
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that effect. In the key countries, some of the secular exclusions from political 
participation tumbled: women in the first place. The same occurred with other 
excluded people, such as Native Americans and Afro-Americans in the 1960s, 
who had lacked effective rights in the United States. The political age of major-
ity was lowered, reducing the exclusion of young people. The secular movement 
was increased by a number of human beings who were attracted to the political 
sphere. In reality, it could be seen as a democratisation process in the institutions 
of power in advanced societies. The decolonisation process can also be interpreted 
in a similar, although much more restricted manner. 
2.2. Reduction in the distribution of power
 In its deepest sense, ‘democracy’ means ‘government by the people’, that is, 
the distribution among the people of ultimate social power. The various institu-
tions by which the expression of that power is articulated, or is supposed to be 
articulated, cannot cancel that primary and profound significance. Different his-
torical societies —and, at different times, even different groups, such as religious 
orders— have institutionalized, in formally diverse ways, that relationship between 
group power, distributed among community members, and decision-making bodies: 
from direct democracy to representative democracy, from the random systems of 
Pericles’ Athens to the most diverse electoral systems.
 However, from the last quarter of the 20th century and coinciding with the 
above-mentioned great transformation, we can observe several inter-related phenom-
ena: a notable reduction in political participation, the appearance of government 
institutions and the increasingly disconnected power of the demos, the invasiveness 
of a discourse that legitimises this exclusion.
 In 1975, the Trilateral Commission, with its Report on the governability of 
democracies, sustained that in the future, representative political systems would 
not be able to meet growing social demands without reinforcing government ex-
ecutive power and without bringing about the depoliticalisation of society. This 
conclusion, whose implicit suppositions need not be studied now, is profoundly 
pessimistic about the feasibility of democratic systems and the rationality of the 
demos that operates in them. Since then, it has been instrumented in several ways 
which we shall mention later.
2.3. The axiom “The private is not political”
 Furthermore, between 1975 and our day, one of modernity’s fundamental 
principles of political thought has collapsed: the supposition that what is produced 
in the private sphere, what is private, is not political; the supposition that what is 
private has no political significance.
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 The anti-patriarchal movement, sustained mainly by women, has unequivocally 
proved that this basic axiom of the theoretical construction of representative de-
mocracy and our self-concept of free citizens cannot be sustained since, for women 
to be able to enjoy effective citizenship, thereby escaping from the discriminatory 
situation of male tutelage, they not only had to be made equal before the law, but 
situations previously considered as private had to be eradicated and transmuted. 
Something as private as the domestic sphere had to be reconsidered.
 The axiom of the apolitical nature of the private sphere has been eliminated 
from theoretical consideration, at least in its generic formulation. Certain phenom-
ena arising in the sphere conceived of as private have turned out to have overall 
political relevance.
 Thus, an important mutation experienced by modern productive institutions 
—companies— also belongs to the private sphere. Companies have given rise to 
the so-called multinational companies: companies that have expanded to several 
countries and which formally submit to several state legislations. In many cases, 
they manage more economic resources than many states and they are in a perma-
nent and occasionally opaque process of absorbing each other. Responsibility for 
their management is diluted by control mechanisms and management in the hands 
of the changing minorities of the social capital. 
 The conglomeration of interests represented by multinational companies, with 
their influence over several governments at the same time and certain inter-state 
institutions, has acquired a recognisable amount of power over groups, although 
it is impossible to classify this power as public. Rather, breaking the inherited 
theoretical categories, it should be seen as a conglomeration of private centres of 
political power, since they adopt clearly political decisions, although they do so 
from private decision-making institutions.
 Multinational companies impose their political power, of government, partly 
through a new lex mercatoria: norms privatly created, of private law, the only 
law that experiences notable growth under globalization conditions.
 This conglomeration of the private political power of large multinational 
companies can be considered one of globalization’s great institutional novelties. 
Paradoxically, deregulation policies encourage the normative capacity of multi-
national companies: they regulate themselves and they regulate other companies. 
Certain forums, such as the Davos Forum, and certain organisations, such as the 
above-mentioned Trilateral Commission, ensure the connection between the poli-
cies of conglomerates of multinational companies and public policies.
2.4. Transmutation of state sovereignty
 States have also lost important aspects and areas of their sovereignty. 
 2.4.1. In European Union States, complex areas of state sovereignty have been 
handed over to the EU’s institutions. These institutions —whose principal legis-
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lative power is the council of heads of State and of government, that is, a body 
made up of institutional delegations with no legislative power within the member 
States— assume the supreme, formal public political willpower in many decision-
making areas (economic and productive, police and military spheres). In monetary 
policy, States have transferred their sovereignty to an institution considered to be 
“independent”, the European Central Bank, which is completely outside formal 
political control. 
 2.4.2. The transfer of States’ sovereignty has also taken place less formally, but 
no less effectively, to the benefit of several international institutions with a great 
deal of weight in economic policies: the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund, and the World Trade Organisation. Other international organisations, such 
as the Group of Most Industrialized Countries, have a decision-making power that 
certain States can hardly resist over economic and industrial policies, which in 
turn have a bearing on many other policies.
 2.4.3. There are two other spheres in which most states —these institutions 
that have appeared in modernity— have ceased being non superiores recognos-
centes bodies, to refer to the main trait that characterises sovereignty, according 
to Althusius. 
 One is the military sphere: the existence of an imperial military power —the 
armed forces of the United States of America— with bases on all continents and 
multilateral and complex alliances, a power higher than any other deployed glo-
bally, questions the very idea of state sovereignty in this state of affairs.
 The permeability of states’ will —or, if we take them into account, plural-state 
institutions such as the European Union— to the policies decided by conglomerates 
of multinational companies referred to above, constitutes a final limiting factor 
on state sovereignty.
 2.4.4. To conclude: the great novelty of globalization in the sphere of real 
institutions consists in having constituted a new sovereignty, supra-state, diffuse 
and polycentric, that limits the sovereignty of States and their public institutions. 
This is also a relevant novelty for theorizing, for philosophical-political and philo-
sophical-legal reflection, since it causes the core of citizen’s modern theorization 
to enter into crisis.
2.5.
 The reverse side of state sovereignty externally restricted by the new supra-
state sovereignty, diffuse and polycentric, is the diminishing of domestic popular 
sovereignty; in the limitation, therefore, of representative democracy.
 The restriction of state sovereignty at the decision-making level, subordinated 
to decisions coming from what we have called diffuse suprastate sovereignty, clearly 
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means that the demos, the end holder of sovereignty in a democratic conception of 
political government, cannot decide against the supra-ordered willpower of dif-
fuse sovereignty.
 In effect, the demos of globalization is not called to formulate its will on 
matters decided by the supra-ordered will. At the most, it can formulate its ac-
quiescence to the higher authority. 
 Not everything can be decided democratically; not if diffuse political will 
opposes it. Therefore, the demos must spontaneously refrain from interfering.
 For this to occur, previously there needs to be a progressive transformation of 
functions in the key institutions for political mediation: the main political parties 
and public opinion.
 When the democratization process went furthest, political parties —historically 
a vehicle for transmitting social will to the core where state will is formed— opened 
public institutions to social demands in some societies. However, political parties 
have now become an instrument to filter and select those demands. They are a 
selective instrument that only allows access to public decision-making authorities 
to those expressions of the people’s will which are compatible with those of the 
diffuse sovereignty or that do not draw its attention. 
 Professionalized politics and the conversion of political parties into semi-pub-
lic bodies (due to their financing, in many countries; in other cases they become 
politically indebted with private capital), as well as their conversion into an ap-
paratus that specialises in the management of political adjustment, have created 
the conditions for the specific political adjustment of globalization. Mainly, it is an 
adjustment between the will of the diffuse suprastate sovereign and the restricted 
popular sovereigns.
 The very logic of the political task of excluding social demands that are 
incompatible with the demands of the diffuse sovereign by filtering them, has 
facilitated and reinforced one of the operation’s requirements: in the first place, 
the de-politicalization of large masses of citizens, their political apathy, the dimi-
nution of their participation, since their exclusion is perceived as an inefficiency 
of participation as such. 
 On the other hand, by turning politics itself into a show, into a story, thereby 
losing —as far as citizens are concerned— the nature of an activity which composes 
the wills existing in the demos, while at the same time preserving its legitimazing 
public value, that endorses the decisions of the diffuse sovereign’s government by 
endorsing those of the representative government. 
 Public opinion has experienced a parallel transformation. The public agora has 
become full of messages given industrially by companies that produce conscience 
content, a sector of the industry that generates feelings of want that match the kind 
of production that will cause the system to expand economically at any given mo-
ment. Information is centralized, selected and disseminated by a few multinational 
companies in that kind of industry. Freedom of expression is completely useless 
in that kind of polluted agora, because the agents operating in it are very unequal. 
The few and diverse messages produced by various fractions of the demos must 
34 JUAN-RAMÓN CAPELLA
Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez, 39 (2005), 25-35.
concur with the industrial messages, repeated millions of times, that dictate the 
duty of “consume in this way” and that describe the system’s critics as having 
good intentions but lacking realism. This new type of agora can only generate 
the autonomous public opinion of the demos sporadically, because the sphere of 
public communication —the so-called mass media— is actually the sphere where 
heteronomy is produced.
2.6. 
 The final legitimacy of globalization’s new political system, its ability to be 
accepted by large masses of human beings in key countries, will not come about 
through regulated methods, but through the industrial dissemination of the ideology 
of efficiency. The implicit discourse of efficiency, of the technological capacity of 
public and private institutional bodies to realise large supra-individual enterprises, 
becomes increasingly credible in the collective imagination. The economic-politi-
cal system is, above all, efficient. That is the appropriate discourse for political 
spectators, for those who wish to hold on to their private relationships and expect 
nothing from the public sphere.
 The efficiency discourse is partly real and partly ideological. Therefore, its 
analysis should make some distinctions. It is true that the hegemonic socio-eco-
nomic system has proved effective for resolving a number of human issues. Life 
expectancy has risen considerably in the key countries, where, furthermore, the 
work-hours needed to produce basic goods has been reduced by ten in the past one 
hundred years. This is an “efficiency” that has little to do with ideology. However, 
the efficiency discourse is not limited to these truths. For one part, it is more com-
plex. For the other, it hides or minimizes another kind of efficiency: efficiency in 
destruction and pollution. It is a discourse that presents the economic policy that 
best fits the maximum expansion of the large multinational companies as the only 
possible logic. The logic of one modernization as the logic of the modernisation. 
It presents the market as separate from the political conditions of its existence. It 
presents the projects of the diffuse suprastate sovereign as the only ones that are 
rational.
 This legitimazing discourse of efficiency, implicit in the omnipresent industrial 
publicity discourse, is itself efficient. Its logic can impose itself above the logic 
of democratic discourse, which —it should not be forgotten— is a self-supported 
discourse whose fragile support does not come from complex social structures but 
merely consists of the will of human beings.
3. 
 The philosophical legal, political and social reflection is now in a position 
to look at the dilemma posed by globalization at the institutional level. It is a 
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dilemma raised by key issues that do not appear to be a dilemma from a purely 
formal perspective. 
 While emphasis is now placed on representative government as never before, 
that is, on the institutional instrumentation of democracy, of government by the 
people, the world’s technocratic government is stronger than ever. That is, the actual 
government over a world globalized by the military-industrial conglomerates, the 
large multinational companies, the experts in handling financial capital, in the 
management of the large industries, in the creation of public opinion, in economic, 
political and military adjustment. 
 An entrepreneurial, military and political technocracy has come to fulfil the 
role of Plato’s Philosopher-King and his Night Council in the government of a 
global Republic. 
 Democratic institutions submit and subordinate themselves to the new imperial 
power. Day by day, democratic procedures become void of content, social rights 
vanish, and political rights become increasingly ineffective, except to acquiesce 
to global power. New institutions appear that are out of reach of the exercise of 
political freedom. Systematic power practices prior to modernity reappear, as can 
be seen by the way defeated soldiers are treated, prisoners are tortured, wars are 
not even declared, the ill and hungry in the poor countries are abandoned without 
remedy.
 Perhaps this is only a temporary phenomenon. The ’30s and ’40s of the 20th 
century were also dark years, just as these years are for many peoples in the world. 
However, the regression of democracy seems to go hand in hand with everything 
that is politically and socially new in the globalized world. There are no new 
counter-examples that can oppose this tendency. If it continues, this tendency 
may end by turning the institutions created in the past by a secular process of 
democratization into fossils (like magnificent but empty shells).

